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Welcoming the Dragon: The Role of Public Opinion in Russian Internet 
Regulation 
Gregory Asmolov (LSE) 
 
1. The Russian Internet under regulatory attack 
Russian internet policymakers and regulatory authorities had a busy year in 
2014. Among other things, new regulatory initiatives this past year included a 
requirement for the registration of popular blogs and a law that prohibits keeping data 
on Russian citizens on servers outside Russian territory.1 This was followed by a 
discussion around creating an independent national segment of the Internet. The idea 
of establishing a “sovereign Internet” appeared on the agenda before a meeting of the 
Russian Security Council dedicated to the Internet and led by President Putin.2 
President Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov explained that the discussion was 
needed because “crazy voices may demand the disconnection of Russia from the 
Internet” as part of sanctions against Russia, particularly in light of the fact that “the 
major administrator of the World Wide Web is the U.S.”3   
Later, officials denied that there was any intention to disconnect Russia from 
the global network, although they argued that there is a need to prepare for possible 
aggression against Russian information infrastructure and to make this more 
independent of external actors.4 According to the Russian Ministry of 
Communication, one of the organizations that could possibly isolate Russia from the 
Internet is ICANN.5 Russian minister of communication Nikolay Nikiforov promised 
to protect Runet from external aggression.6 Following this statement, Russian media 
revealed that the ministry is planning to develop an autonomous Internet 
                                                        
1 Kulikova, A., (2014, May 19). The ‘Balkanisation’ of Russia’s internet.  
Retrieved from  https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexandra-
kulikova/%E2%80%98balkanisation%E2%80%99-of-russia%E2%80%99s-internet 
2 Голицына А., (2014, September 19). Суверенные Интернет. Ведомости. Retrieved from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/33610271/suverennyj-internet?full#cut 
3 Райбман., Н. (2014, October 1). Песков: «Безумные голоса» могут потребовать отключить 
Россию от интернета. Ведомости. Retrieved from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/34094991/peskov-ne-isklyuchaet-trebovaniya-bezumnyh-
golosov 
4 Путин пообещал не ограничивать доступ к глобальному интернету. (2014, October 1). Retrieved 
from http://www.interfax.ru/russia/399699 
5 Рункевич Д., Малай Е. (2014, October 15). Минкомсвязи признало возможность блокировки 
Рунета со стороны ICANN. Izvestiya. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/577486 
6 В Минкомсвязи успокоили испугавшихся отключения интернета Пользователей. (2014, 
October 4). Retrieved from http://lenta.ru/news/2014/10/04/dontworry/ 
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infrastructure including Russia-based root Domain Name System servers and a 
Russian national Routing Information system.7 
Despite the welcome news that Russia has not yet disconnected itself from the 
global network, many experts point out that Runet is becoming more and more 
regulated. Prominent blogger and Internet entrepreneur Anton Nosik suggested that 
new Russian legislation might soon bring “the last day of the Russian Internet.”8 
KremlinRussia, a well-known political satire blog, published “Runet’s will” in 
preparation for the death of the Russian Internet.9 
While Runet is not yet dead and people can still express their opinions online, 
the authorities have at their disposal a broad menu of tools and a legislative 
framework that allows them to censor almost any type of content, ban websites, or 
prosecute Internet users. In addition, some of the major Internet companies like 
Yandex and Vkontakte (whose founder, Pavel Durov, has left Russia) have 
experienced changes in their leadership and ownership which can be considered part 
of the authorities’ efforts to gain more control over the major actors in this field.  
 
2. Russian public opinion on Internet regulation 
Most of those concerned about the increasing limitations on Internet freedom 
in Russia have dedicated special efforts to monitoring the activities of the Russian 
authorities. Initiatives to protect Internet freedom and oppose regulation are focused 
on the institutions that are introducing this regulation, whether they are the President’s 
administration, parliament, or the courts.  Some are speaking out against the new 
regulation, but there are limited measures against the Russian regulation juggernaut.   
Is attention to these regulatory institutions helping to curtail the assault on 
Internet freedoms, or, at least, to slow it down? Are state institutions the core of the 
problem? Many discussions around Internet freedom suggest an inherent assumption 
that Internet regulation, censorship, or any repressive measures aimed at online spaces 
happen against the will of the people in general and against Internet users in 
particular. This argument, however, requires further analysis and consideration. 
                                                        
7 Совбез России поручил создать автономную инфраструктуру Рунета. (2014, October 28). 
Retrieved from http://lenta.ru/news/2014/10/28/inet/ 
8 Nosik, A. (2014, May 15). I Helped Build Russia's Internet. Now Putin Wants to Destroy It. New 
Republic. Retrieved from http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117771/putins-internet-crackdown-
russias-first-blogger-reacts 
9 Завещание Рунета. (2014, April 30). Kremlin Russia. Retrieved from 
http://kermlinrussia.com/zavieshchaniie-runieta/ 
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A recent poll by the Levada Center suggests that 54% of the Russian 
population supports the opinion that the Internet includes many dangerous websites 
and therefore should be censored, while 32% argue that the threat is overestimated 
and there is no place for censorship. In response to a question about attitudes on a law 
that will limit the access of Russian users to the global network, 37% expressed 
varying degrees of negative feelings, 15% were supportive, while 38% were neutral 
and expressed no interest in the issue.10  
Recently, the Annenberg School’s Center for Global Communication Studies’ 
Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) together with Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center (VCIOM), released a survey of 1,601 respondents that probed deeper into the 
attitudes of Russian users toward Internet regulation.11 According to the survey, 59% 
of Russian Internet users saw no association between Internet regulation and their 
own personal freedom, while 41% thought Internet regulation negatively impacted 
their freedom. Additionally, 48% percent of Internet users believed that shutting down 
the Internet for a limited period could be justified in a case of a national emergency 
and 9% in a case of mass protests, while 43% opposed such a temporary shut-down.12 
The IPO’s survey also includes an investigation into what type of online content is 
considered by Russian respondents to be undesirable. While only 5% thought that 
information threatening political stability should be censored, 45% argued that foreign 
news-media websites should be censored. When questioned about more specific 
examples, however, 59% said that websites with content concerning homosexuality 
should be blocked, 46% supported blocking social networking groups organizing anti-
government protests and 43% supported blocking personal blogs that call for regime 
change.13 In addition, 70% of respondents supported the idea that all personal 
websites should be registered with the Ministry of Communication. Interestingly, the 
security services, followed by the Russian government, were considered the most 
trusted institutions that should be responsible for regulation and censorship.14  
In light of the substantial support for political censorship, it should come as no 
surprise that people in Russia were not ready to actively oppose regulation. Only 9% 
                                                        
10 Интернет-цензура. (2014, October 14). Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/print/14-10-
2014/internet-tsenzura 
11 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. 
Philadelphia. Center for Global Communications Studies. 
12 Ibid, p. 25 
13 Ibid, p. 20 
14 Ibid, p. 24 
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of Internet users said they would consider participating in protests against Internet 
restrictions.15 Furthermore, the only type of Internet censorship that a sizable number 
of Internet users said would mobilize them to participate in protests was a complete 
ban on the use of the Internet such as exists within the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (i.e. North Korea).16 The prohibition of online political activity and the total 
prohibition of anonymity were each considered a reason for protest by 7% of Internet 
users.17  In other words, the potential for protest on these issues is extremely low. 
 
3. Public opinion and multistakeholderism in Internet governance 
One of the dominant approaches in Internet governance suggests that if 
institutional actors try to increase the degree of regulation in accordance with their 
own interests, the community of users will exercise its voice in order to prevent this. 
In other words, the possibility of a balance of power between the different actors 
involved in Internet governance is suggested. The idea of multistakeholderism as a 
governance framework relying on the involvement of various actors is based on this 
assumption, which also suggests that the public is one of the stakeholders in Internet 
governance.  Accordingly, the clash between the public interest and the interests of 
governments should lead to a compromise-based policy. 
In this light, we should ask two questions. The first is whether users are able to 
exercise their voices in general and within authoritarian environments in particular. 
The second is whether the user community has any independent voice to exercise.  
The data from Russia suggests that an independent user voice scarcely exists, and 
based on this data, one might not expect the community of users to oppose Internet 
regulation in Russia. State governance of the Internet is not balanced by a separate 
and sometimes oppositional voice of the public in the Russian case: it is largely 
supported and empowered by the public.  
For instance, recently, the Russian ministry of communication suggested 
moving the management of .ru domains from the relatively independent Coordination 
Center for TLD RU (http://www.cctld.ru/en/) to the ministry itself.18  Some experts 
have suggested that this could be another step (although only one among many) 
                                                        
15 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. p. 24 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Новый В., Черненко Е., Лавицкий В.  (2014, September 23). КЦ и точка. Коммерсантъ. 
Retrieved from http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2572991 
 5 
toward stricter Internet regulation and part of a Russian policy to ensure that the 
authorities have full control of the communication infrastructure. According to 
IANA’s “Delegating or redelegating a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD)” rules, 
those who ask for redelegation must demonstrate “that the request serves the local 
Internet community’s interest.”19 This requirement, which is a reflection on ICANN’s 
multistakeholderism policy, assumes the existence of a “local Internet community” 
and its capacity to communicate its interests independently from state institutions. In 
light of the data outlined above, it should be no surprise that there has been no 
expression of opposition or protest against this move by the user community. 
That said, there are some actors in Russia who vigorously oppose Internet 
regulation. The Russian Pirate Party launched a special website, Roskomsvoboda 
(http://rublacklist.net), to monitor new restrictions on Internet freedom and expose the 
blacklist of banned websites managed by the Russian Ministry of Communication. 
There is also an Association of Internet Users (http://freerunet.ru), as well as some 
vocal independent bloggers, experts, software developers, journalists and managers of 
online projects. All of these voices, however, have had very little impact on Russian 
policy on Internet regulation, and, it seems, little impact on Russian public opinion. In 
a small amount of cases, the Russian Association of Electronic Communication 
(RAEC), which lobbies on behalf of Russian Internet companies and  includes some 
of the leading commercial actors in Runet, has tried to oppose some of the most 
radical initiatives which may pose a significant threat to the business interests of 
Internet companies. These efforts, however, also remain marginal, and RAEC avoids 
any conflict with the Russian authorities. The surveys mentioned above underscore 
this conclusion: those who oppose Internet regulation are marginal because they are in 
opposition not only to the authorities but also to the majority of public opinion. The 
Russian government feels free to introduce more and more initiatives to regulate the 
Internet not just because there is little opposition, but because it is supported by the 
public. 
 Even an authoritarian government such as Russia’s20 seeks legitimacy and 
support from its citizens, and would not wish to run the risk of acting against strong 
                                                        
19 Delegating or redelegating a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD). (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.iana.org/help/cctld-delegation 
20 Russia is approached as an authoritarian state on the basis of the Economist’s Democracy Index 
2012. The report says: “Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today’s Russia 
has been called a 'managed' (or 'stage managed') democracy.” 
 6 
public opinion. One possible implication is that those seeking to block radical 
initiatives for Internet regulation should shift from exclusive attention on monitoring 
the authorities and lamenting new restrictions  and turn towards efforts to shape 
public opinion and engage users about the protection of Internet freedom.  A primary 
way to slow regulation is by attempting to disturb the government’s perception that it 
has full public support. To this end, it is important first to understand why the 
majority of the public are loyal supporters of Internet regulation and of the idea that 
these efforts should be led by the government.  
 
4. Factors in public support for Internet regulation 
While the data from the survey conducted by the IPO and VCIOM contradicts 
the assumption that the public will automatically oppose restrictive Internet regulation 
and online censorship, the question that needs to be asked is why the public supports 
such interventions. How is the legitimacy of regulation achieved? Is the positive 
attitude toward online censorship associated with people’s education, age, gender, 
where they live, or the scale of their Internet usage?  
The IPO survey provides some insights that may help us to respond to these 
questions. On the one hand, one can argue that there is an association between the 
scale of Internet usage and the attitudes toward censorship. According to the data, 
76% of heavy Internet users and 61% of light Internet users thought that the Internet 
had a positive effect on people’s lives, while only 21% of non-users shared this 
attitude. Meanwhile, 55% of non-users thought that the Internet had a negative 
impact, and only 23% of light and 15% of heavy Internet users agreed with this 
perspective.21  
 Both surveys that are discussed in this article provide some data that 
complicates the commonly held belief that urban populations, youth, and those with 
higher education levels are more likely to oppose censorship and regulation. For 
instance, the data from the Levada Center demonstrates that while the difference in 
attitudes between different age, education, and location demographics is not 
substantial, higher support for Internet censorship can be found among those living in 
big cities (except Moscow), the younger group of respondents (18-24) tend to support 
censorship more than the older group, people with higher education support 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
21 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. p. 15 
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regulation more than those with only school education, and woman support regulation 
more than men.  
The data from the IPO survey illustrates that there was little to no significant 
difference between respondents from more urban and rural areas in their opposition to 
the Internet’s temporary shutdown.22 In other words, the data from both surveys 
suggest that demographic characteristics do not necessarily provide a good 
explanation for differences in attitudes toward the Internet and the regulation of 
cyberspace. That said, one of the most remarkable findings of the survey by the 
Levada Center is a decline in support for Internet censorship over time. While in 2012 
censorship was supported by 63% of respondents, the 2014 results showed only 54% 
expressed the same opinion. Meanwhile, agreement with the idea that the threats 
linked to the Internet are overestimated and there is no place for censorship grew from 
19% to 31%.23 One can argue that the latter effect can be associated with increases in 
the number of Internet users. Director of the Sakharov Center, Sergey Lukashevsky, 
pointed out in an interview with Dozhd TV that support for censorship was 
particularly significant among non-users. “I think it would not be audacious to suggest 
a hypothesis that the decrease in support for censorship can be associated with the 
increase in the number of advanced Internet users in Russia,” Lukashevsky argued.24 
Nonetheless, alongside the arguments that suggest an association between the 
scale of usage and the attitude toward Internet regulation, an alternative view suggests 
that more substantial reasons for support for Internet censorship are related to Russian 
political culture.  Freedom of speech, Lukashevsky said, was not valued by the 
majority of Russians. According to Aleksey Levinson of the Levada Center, most 
Russians did not share the negative attitude toward censorship that can be found 
among liberal intellectuals. 25  Moreover, he argued that Russians did not link the 
banning of “dangerous” websites with a restriction of human rights, concluding, “A 
very high number of people think that on the Internet, people can see things that they 
                                                        
22 Full demographic information was not included in the report but can be made available upon request. 
23 Интернет-цензура. (2014, October 14). Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/print/14-10-
2014/internet-tsenzura 
24 « Свобода слова, в принципе, не в приоритете». Михаил Козырев обсуждает с экспертами 
свежий опрос Левада-центра о предпочтении россиянами цензуры. (2014, October 14). Kozyrev 
Online. Retrieved from 
http://tvrain.ru/articles/svoboda_slova_v_printsipe_ne_prioritete_mihail_kozyrev_obsuzhdaet_s_ekspe
rtami_svezhij_opros_levada_tsentra_o_predpochtenii_rossijanami_tsenzury-376619/ 
25 Kichanova, V., Больше половины россиян одобрили введение цензуры в интернете (2014, 
October 14). Retrieved from http://slon.ru/fast/russia/bolshe-poloviny-rossiyan-odobrili-vvedenie-
tsenzury-v-internete-1170875.xhtml 
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shouldn’t see and therefore welcome censorship. But in general Russians support 
freedom of speech.”26 According to a sociologist from the Levada Center, respondents 
tended to express a higher degree of opposition to political censorship.27 At the same 
time, the data from the IPO survey demonstrates that various forms of political 
censorship online were supported by pluralities of respondents, with support for 
censorship greatest for online content depicting homosexuality or suicide.28 
The picture derived from the data and the expert opinions is controversial. On 
the one hand, the data allows us to argue that we are witnessing a positive 
development associated with the increase in the number of the Internet users. In this 
case, if adopting the hypothesis that more active users tend to be more opposed to 
regulation and censorship, one can be relatively optimistic since various sets of data 
demonstrate that older people and those living in rural areas in Russia are going 
online in higher numbers than in the past.  We can argue, however, that the problem is 
not related to the number of Internet users, but to the normative dimension of a 
Russian society that is less sensitive to censorship. In other words, frequency of 
Internet usage is associated with attitudes about censorship, but Russian political 
culture attenuates the impact of Internet usage on censorship attitudes. 
One might suggest that the contradictions seen in the data are actually the 
most valuable information contained in these surveys. The contradictions demonstrate 
the degree of confusion and lack of knowledge about the role of the Internet among 
the Russian population (and this is not necessarily directly or significantly associated 
with Internet usage). Citizens in general, and Internet users specifically, do not have 
strong views about the role, threats, or regulation of the Internet. In this state of 
confusion and even ignorance, public opinion about the Internet can easily be 
manipulated.  
Lukashevsky points out that both the authorities and various social organizations that 
are interested in control over society will continue to manipulate the issue of banning 
child pornography to justify Internet censorship. Like any other technology, the 
Internet is the subject of social construction by different actors. Those who follow the 
development of the Internet in Russia can see a continuous policy of constructing the 
                                                        
26 Kichanova, V., Больше половины россиян одобрили введение цензуры в интернете (2014, 
October 14). 
27 Ibid.  
28 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. p. 20 
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Internet as a threat and the Internet itself as a technology responsible for a variety of 
social problems.  
The social construction of the Internet in Russia includes linking it not only to 
the problems of pornography and crime, but also to the increase in suicide attacks and 
to “sexual minority propaganda” that poses a threat to family values. The Internet is 
also framed as a technology that is used by foreign agents seeking to cause social and 
political instability in Russia, and this is supported by the conspiracy theories mapped 
by Andrey Soldatov, as well as in the results of the IPO survey itself.29 30The recent 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine has contributed to the framing of the Internet as 
an instrument of psychological and information warfare.  
One of the phenomena that can be associated with the Russian construction of 
the ‘Internet as Threat’ is the relative balance between the degrees of usage and trust 
in traditional and new media. With regard to usage, central Russian TV dominates as 
the number one source of information for 60% of all Russians and one of the three top 
sources of information for 84% of all Russians. In comparison, online news sites were 
selected as the primary source of information for only 10% and in the top three 
sources of information by just 29% of Russians.31 Regarding trust, the IPO survey 
also shows that, even amongst internet users, the degree of trust in television as a 
source of information (88% trust TV news) is higher than the degree of trust in 
Internet publications (75% of internet users).32  
The Internet is not only a technology that can be used to introduce alternative 
framings and to challenge state-affiliated discourses, but also something that has been 
constructed and framed. It both constructs and is constructed. The statistics about trust 
in different media suggest that TV will continue to dominate the framing of a variety 
of topics, including the Internet, for Russian citizens. As long as the authorities 
control the majority of TV stations in Russia, the way these stations construct the 
Internet will contribute to shaping public opinion, including the opinions of Internet 
users.  There is a double advantage to this tactic for the traditional media in Russia, 
particularly TV. Complicit with the state, they propagate the ‘Internet as Threat’ 
                                                        
29 Soldatov, A.  (2014, April 29). Putin, the Internet, and Popular Conspiracies. The Moscow Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-the-internet-and-popular-
conspiracies/499189.html 
30 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. p. 17 
31 Ibid, p. 13 
32 Ibid, p. 14 
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narrative and legitimate its regulation, which keeps trust in the Internet low and 
maintains the traditional media’s monopoly on shaping public opinion.   
This dynamic between new and old media brings us back to the question of 
whether the increase in the number of Internet users, and in particular the expansion 
of Internet usage in rural areas and among older populations, can lead to substantial 
change in public opinion toward the Internet. We continue to see more and more 
Internet users, but the opinions of these users about the Internet are still shaped by the 
traditional media and not necessarily by their own usage experience, and we should 
not necessarily expect substantial change in attitudes toward Internet regulation as a 
result of continuing Internet proliferation, but perhaps even an increase in support for 
Internet regulation.  
 
5. Bringing users back to the scene: Reframing of the Internet and alternative 
imaginaries 
 
While the increase in the number of Internet users is not expected to lead to 
substantial changes in public opinion, there is another process that may be more 
significant. This is the change not in the number of users, and not even in the 
frequency of usage, but in the purpose and the practices of usage.  
The IPO survey demonstrates that the most popular ways in which the Internet 
is used by Russian respondents included searching for information for personal use 
(63%), communicating in social networks (62%), downloading videos (37%) and 
music (38%), reading national news (45%) and corresponding by e-mail (39%). Far 
fewer respondents used the Internet in order to search for friends and people with 
similar interests (15%), downloading/purchasing software or apps (15%), manage 
finances online (12%) or to look for employment (10%). Only 1% of responders 
wrote a blog.33  
One should differentiate between the more instrumental, consumptive 
functions of the Internet and more substantial, productive functions. The instrumental 
functions support the everyday activities of users (for example, communication or 
leisure) without significant change to their way of life. The substantial functions 
include online production skills and activities such as writing a blog, posting videos, 
                                                        
33 Nisbet, E. (2015). Benchmarking Public Demand: Russia’s Appetite for Internet Control. p. 10 
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coding, or organizing new groups and identities online. These online activities allow 
for the possibility of new forms of self-realization, skill acquisition, social 
mobilization, as well as various forms of political activism. The framing of the 
Internet only as a set of instrumental tools and resources for leisure coupled with the 
narrative of the Internet as a significant threat to security, morals and stability, should 
be challenged by what has been conceptualized by Mansell as alternative imaginaries 
of the Internet.34 In her earlier work, Mansell applies Amartya Sen’s notion of 
freedom as a realization of the individual’s own capabilities to the online world. She 
argues for “the rights and entitlements of individuals to the opportunity to acquire 
capabilities for effectively using the electronic spaces created by the new media to 
strengthen their own freedom to decide between alternative ways of living.”35  
In order to challenge the current framing of the Internet in Russia, we must 
seek to promote an alternative imaginary that allows for the realization that the 
Internet may have substantial, life-changing value for individuals, and this imaginary 
should be used to balance the framing of the ‘Internet as Threat,’ with the realization 
that Internet regulation is not only a way to address threats, but also something that 
limits people’s opportunities. If users do not realize what they need the Internet for, 
their understanding of the Internet will be dominated by the perception of the Internet 
as a threat, and therefore in need of regulation.  Challenging the current imaginaries 
of the Internet should also be reflected through the practices of how people use the 
Internet. Decreasing the degree of public support for regulation and understanding 
that further regulation could erode public support may act as a bulwark against new 
restrictions on cyberspace.  
There are currently some examples of global initiatives to promote 
imaginaries of the Internet that are focused on user empowerment. One of these 
projects is the “Web We Want,” initiated by Sir Tim Berners Lee. According to the 
project’s statement, it seeks to “connect and strengthen local groups, especially in the 
developing world, building a movement to empower citizens to make, claim and 
shape the Web they want both nationally and globally, so as to achieve the world we 
want.”36 The vision of the project relies on “the UN Declaration of Human Rights and 
                                                        
34 Mansell, R. (2012). Imagining the Internet: Communication, innovation, and governance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
35 Mansell, R. (2001). New Media and the Power of Networks [pdf]. Retrieved from 
http://www.c3l.uni-oldenburg.de/cde/OMDE%20626/Module%202/Mansell_lecture.pdf 
36 Web We Want. (n.d.) About. Retrieved from https://webwewant.org/about_us 
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the goals of social justice.”37 This type of project can provide an opportunity for 
challenging state-sponsored framings of cyberspace and changing public opinion 
about the role of the Internet. It is important to note, however, that this type of 
initiative should not transform into the “Web We Don’t Want” when discussion is 
structured around threats that can be associated with the Internet (for example to 
privacy or security).  
 
6. It’s not only about Russia: International dimensions of internal public opinion 
While this analysis is focused on Russia, the role of the Internet in shaping 
public opinion and in justifying regulation goes far beyond any specific region or type 
of political system. The Russian authorities would like the ‘Internet as Threat’ 
narrative to work externally on an international stage, just as it functions 
domestically, 38 and Russian initiatives for institutional reforms (for example the 
relocation of Internet governance from ICANN to ITU) are structured as a response to 
a variety of threats. The internal model described here is also applicable in other 
places around the world. Even most democratic states have actors and institutions 
promoting a threat-driven framing of technologies in general and of the Internet in 
particular, seeking to manipulate or increase public support for the introduction of 
new forms of regulation.  One problem with the multistakeholder model of Internet 
governance is that the community of Internet users is one of the major stakeholders, 
but not necessarily an independent or powerful one. A security-driven framing of the 
Internet seeks to exclude the community of users even further.  
Russian writer Evgeny Shvarts argues in his play The Dragon that it is not 
enough to kill the Dragon in order to free people from his totalitarian rule--the 
“dragon” has to be killed in each of the people who lived under the dragon’s rule.39 
The struggle for Internet freedom is often focused on the institutional “dragons” 
responsible for new forms of regulation. It also assumes that the public can actively 
participate in protecting its own freedoms and act as a counterbalance to institutional 
actors in the multistakeholder ecosystem. The data from Russian public opinion 
                                                        
37  Web We Want. (n.d.) About.  
38 Asmolov G. (2013, December 16). A Shift in International Information Security: The Story of a 
Diplomatic Oxymoron. CGCS Mediawire. Retrieved from http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/a-shift-in-
international-information-security-the-story-of-a-diplomatic-oxymoron/ 
39 Schwarz, E.L. (1944). The Dragon. Retrieved from http://a7sharp9.com/dragon.html 
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surveys contradict these assumptions and demonstrate that one of the fundamental 
issues in Internet governance is the public support for Internet censorship.  
This article has tried to argue that protecting Internet freedom is not possible 
without a shift in public opinion. It requires both opposition to the state-sponsored 
framing of the Internet and the expansion of Internet imaginaries beyond the focus on 
security threats and leisure. Accordingly, the core struggle is not a struggle around 
Internet regulation, but a struggle around the construction of the Internet’s role in the 
everyday life of its users. 
 
 
 
 
